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Because of the recent focus on television violence, it is more a question of "when,"
rather than "if," Congress will take action on this issue. "Safe harbor" regulation,
or restricting violent programming to certain hours of the day, is one form of regu-
lation that is recurrently suggested as a means for dealing with the potential ills
created by television violence. The possibility of such regulation implicates numer-
ous constitutional issues. This Article addresses whether "safe harbor" regulation
of television violence is feasible without violating the First Amendment and other
provisions of the Constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
[R]ecent tragedies ... show that changing the culture of violence won't be
easy. It will require assumption of new responsibilities by parents, schools,
churches, and law enforcement as well as the media. And assuming these
new responsibilities will require us to face up to current problems unblink-
ingly, and address them realistically.
-SenatorJohn McCain'
* Associate, Jones Day, Cleveland, Ohio. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 2002; B.A.,
Ohio State University, 1999. I would like to thank my family for their constant support in all
of my endeavors. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Christine Gall for her
critical comments and encouragement while I was drafting this Article. The views set forth in
this Article are completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any employer
or client either past or present.
1. Television Violence: Hearing on S. 876 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing]
(prepared statement of Sen. John McCain, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation) (discussing the difficulties of regulating television violence).
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Television, compact discs, and video games bring violence into the open win-
dows of our homes. By the time kids reach the age of eighteen, they have
witnessed as many as 26,000 murders on television. But not all those mur-
ders are the same. Some make a child pause at the consequences of violence,
while others pile up in an empty litany of bashing, stabbing, and shooting
that creates a numbness which in turn requires even crueler or gorier violence
to induce aflutter of shock.
2-Bill Bradley
The history of the law offree expression is one of vindication in cases involv-
ing speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even ugly ....
If television broadcasts can expose children to the real risk of harmful expo-
sure to indecent materials, even in their own home and without parental
consent, there is a problem the Government can address. It must do so, how-
ever, in a way consistent with First Amendment principles.
-Justice Anthony Kennedys
In recent years, the onslaught of media violence directed toward
and available to children and adolescents has drawn intensifying
criticism. Television violence in particular has drawn strong politi-
cal condemnation, and both Democrats and Republicans have
shown resolve to address this issue.' One proposed solution is the
regulation of television violence on broadcast channels to certain
times during the night.6 This is because these "safe harbor"
2. Bill Bradley, Violence in America, 10 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 43,47-48 (1994)
(explaining the results of exposing children to depictions of violence).
3. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2000) (speak-
ing for a majority that included Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Ginsberg regarding the ability of the government to regulate speech that is potentially
harmful to children).
4. See Alexandra Marks, Washington Turns Up the Debate on TV Violence, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 14, 1995, at 1 (discussing increased political interest in the regulation of
television violence); Youth and Violence, BUFFALO NEWS, July 29, 2000, at C2 (reporting on
growing social concerns about the relationship between media violence and youth violence).
5. See Jane Hall, Four Senators Assail TV Broadcasters in FCC Letter, L.A. TIMES, May 25,
2000, at Al (showing political commitment to ending the alleged problems created by tele-
vision violence); infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (demonstrating Congressional
commitment to explore and cure the possible ills created by television violence).
6. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing recent legislation to regu-
late television violence to certain hours of the day).
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hours7 are presumably when children and adolescents are least
likely to be watching. The possibility of such regulation implicates
numerous constitutional issues. This Article addresses whether
"safe harbor" regulation of television violence is feasible without
violating the First Amendment and other provisions of the Consti-
tution.
The remainder of this Part contains general statements about
the scope and timeliness of this Article. Part II provides a survey of
previous attempts to regulate violence in the media. Part III pro-
vides an analysis of the Supreme Court's stance on the
constitutionality of regulating broadcast materials. Part IV and Part
V analyze respectively the compelling interests for regulating tele-
vision violence and the constitutional obstacles to such regulation.
Finally, Part VI discusses the application of Supreme Court prece-
dent to "safe harbor" regulation and the implications of this
precedent.
This Article ultimately concludes that it is unlikely that television
violence can be regulated to "safe harbor" hours in any meaningful
way. Any regulation of television violence will be closely scrutinized
by the Supreme Court because of the potential chilling effect on
free speech. Even though compelling interests probably exist justi-
fying the regulation of television violence, less restrictive means are
likely available, and because of the difficulty in defining violence,
any regulation will probably suffer from constitutionally impermis-
sible vagueness and overbreadth.
The scope of this Article focuses on violence on broadcast televi-
sion, rather than cable, because the Supreme Court has
consistently shown a greater willingness to allow content-based
regulation of subject matter on broadcast channels.s Because of
this greater latitude, "safe harbor" regulation is much more viable
on broadcast television, rather than cable.9
In this Article, the analysis of whether "safe harbor" regulation
of television violence on broadcast channels violates the First
Amendment is timely because of the lack of Supreme Court guid-
ance on the topic, the failure of previous scholarship to fully
7. The term "safe harbor" is the name given to the hours that a regulated form of
broadcast can be aired. This term is commonly used in relation to indecent materials and
generally denotes the hours between 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807-08,
812 (discussing regulation of indecency to "safe harbor" hours).
8. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1997)
(showing the Court's application of the First Amendment to regulation of cable); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (showing the Court's application of the First Amend-
ment to content-based regulation of broadcast media).
9. See infra Part III.B.3.
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explore "safe harbor" regulation, and the political resolve to face
this issue. The Supreme Court has never spoken on whether the
First Amendment allows television violence on broadcast channels
to be regulated to certain hours of the day.'° The issue remains
open whether "safe harbor" regulation of television violence is a
per se violation of the Constitution, or whether it might be accept-
able under certain conditions."
Although law review articles and comments exist that discuss this
topic, no previous scholarship provides as comprehensive and ex-
pansive review of the constitutionality of "safe harbor" regulation
as this Article. 2 This is especially true because most of the existing
scholarship was drafted before the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.'s In that case, the
Court declared § 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA) unconstitutional for requiring cable operators to ensure
that indecent or sexually explicit programming on channels pri-
10. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 6-8. (prepared testimony of Robert Corn-Revere, Ad-
junct Professor, Institute of Communications Law, Columbus School of Law) (discussing the
lack of precedent from the Supreme Court regarding the regulation of television violence to
"safe harbor" hours).
11. But see Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem.,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (stating that sexually indecent material could not be regulated on the
grounds that it contains violence against women because media violence is protected speech
no matter how insidious).
12. A handful of articles and comments discuss "safe harbor" regulation briefly. See,
e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Doing Right by Our Kids: A Case Study in the Perils of Making Policy on
Television Violence, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 397, 405-08 (1994) (discussing "safe harbor" regula-
tion of television violence generally without undertaking a thorough constitutional analysis);
Ian Matheson Ballard, Jr., Note, See No Evil, Hear No Evil Television Violence and the First
Amendment, 81 VA. L. Rv. 175, 213-14 (1995) (mentioning "zoning" of television violence to
'safe harbor" hours and suggesting that it might be more constitutionally viable than an
across-the-board reduction of violence); Benjamin P. Deutsch, Note, Wile E. Coyote, Acme
Explosives and the First Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of Regulating Violence on Broadcast
Television, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1101, 1162-70 (1994) (discussing the difficulties in drafting
"safe harbor" regulation of television violence that is narrowly tailored and not unconstitu-
tionally vague); Forouzan M. Khalili, Comment, Television Violence: Legislation to Combat the
National Epidemic, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 219, 252 (1996) (endorsing "safe harbor" regulation
without specific analysis of its constitutionality); Laura B. Schneider, Comment, Warning:
Television Violence May Be Harmful to Children; But the First Amendment May Foil Congressional
Attempts to Legislate Against It, 49 U. MIAMI L. Rxv. 477, 507-10 (1994) (analyzing "safe har-
bor" regulation of television violence briefly and suggesting that it will be treated the same
as "safe harbor" regulation of television indecency).
A number of articles and comments deal with other issues relating to the regulation of
television violence. See, e.g., Robert Corn-Revere, Television Violence and the Limits of Volunta-
rism, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 187 (1995); David V. Scott, The V-Chip Debate: Blocking Television Sex,
Violence, and the First Amendment, 16 Loy. L.A ENT. L. Rv. 741 (1996); Stephen J. Kim,
Comment, "Viewer Discretion Is Advised" A Structural Approach to the Issue of Television Violence,
142 U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (1994).
13. 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (exploring the constitutional implications of "safe harbor"
regulation of cable television).
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marily dedicated to sexually-oriented material was either fully
scrambled or played between the hours of 10:00 P.M. and 6:00
A.M. 4 Playboy does not resolve the issue that this Article addresses,
however, because Playboy focused solely on sexual content, rather
than violence, and cable, rather than network television, but the
possibilities for comparison are strong.
This Article also differs from previous scholarship because it fo-
cuses solely on the regulation of television violence on broadcast
networks, e.g., ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC. Most of the other schol-
arship fails to give a sufficiently detailed explanation of how and
why the Supreme Court has treated different media differently.
1 5
This Article is important because acts of juvenile violence within
the past decade have created political resolve to find a solution to
the problems that television violence may cause.1 6 A political fervor
has developed to find a response to the steady diet of violent mes-
sages fed to the nation's youth each day.' 7 At this particular point in
time, new technologies, such as the V-chip, have emerged that may
answer the concerns of the American public.' Questions remain,
however, as to the feasibility of technological solutions to regulate
the viewing of television violence. 9
14. Id. at 806, 827.
15. See id. at 880-81 (examining the differences between cable and broadcast media);
see also supra note 12 (providing a survey of previous scholarship examining "safe harbor"
regulation). But see Kevin Saunders, Regulating the Access of Children to Televised Violence, 2002
L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 813, 819-21 (examining whether violent material can be regulated to
"safe harbor" hours and discussing the Supreme Court's differing treatment of broadcast
versus cable television).
16. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 9-10
(2000) (discussing increases in juvenile crime); Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games, and A
Voice of Reason:Judge Posner to the Defense of Kids' Culture and the First Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1, 21-24 (2002) (examining the recent rash of school shootings, including the Col-
umbine massacre in Littleton, Colorado, which is the deadliest school shooting spree in the
nation's history); Timothy Egan, Santee Is Latest Blow to Myth Of Suburbia's Safer Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2001, atAl (reporting on the recent rash of school shootings).
17. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing recent Congressional ef-
forts to examine and regulate television violence).
18. See Brett Ferenchak, Comment, Regulating Indecent Broadcasting: Setting Sail from Safe
Harbors or Sunk by the V-Chip?, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 831 (1996) (describing the V-chip and how
it functions).
19. See generally TELEVISION VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (James T. Hamilton ed.,
1998) (containing a detailed analysis of the V-chip).
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II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE
VIOLENCE IN THE MEDIA
Attempts to regulate depictions of violence in the public realm
have been numerous and constant in the history of the United
States. Although a complete recounting of each of these attempts
is beyond the limits of this Article, the constant nature of the cru-
sade against violence as entertainment and a few proposed
measures to regulate television violence should be examined.
A. The Crusade Against Violence as Entertainment
Violence has been viewed as a source of entertainment since an-
cient times. 20 Despite this long history, individuals have often
spoken out against violence as entertainment and its effects on so-
ciety.
21
In the past century, outcry against violence in the media has
been a constant in the United States. After World War I, concerns
mounted regarding the effects of the growing movie industry.22 In
the 1940s, public outcry focused on the print media2 3 and led to
the Supreme Court invalidating a prohibition on the sale of maga-
zines primarily dedicated to "bloodshed, lust or crime."24 In the
past fifty years, as television has become an increasing force in so-
ciety, broadcasters have often been accused of ignoring their
responsibility to society by airing violence to increase ratings and
profits. 25 In fact, a 1993 study found teachers, parents, and princi-
20. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Violence has always been and remains a central interest of humankind and a recurrent,
even obsessive theme of culture both high and low."); Schneider, supra note 12, at 478
("Throughout the ages, violence has played a significant role in literary works. Writers as far
back as the ancient Greek playwrights incorporated violence in their stories. Since then,
violence has been prevalent in esteemed literature, throughout history from the works of
Shakespeare to those of Tennessee Williams.").




24. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 511 (1948).
25. See, e.g., Khalili, supra note 12, at 219 ("[I]t is imperative that our children are
properly educated and given appropriate guidance. Unfortunately, the media all too often
undermines this important goal by broadcasting violence-ridden programs .... "); Sam
Brownback, Broadcasters Go Too Far, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2004, at A10 ("Due to strong com-
petition, many broadcasters are neglecting their public-interest responsibilities and pushing
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pals cited rap music and television as the most frequent cause of
violence other than family dysfunction.26 In the past few decades,
rock and hip hop music have been recurrently cited as reasons for
juvenile delinquency and youth violence.27 Most recently, critics of
media violence have taken aim at the video game industry.
2
The crusade against television violence has been a frequent
source of Congressional debate. First Amendment scholar Robert
Corn-Revere describes the past fifty years of Congressional activity
relating to television violence:
In this long history of censorship, perennial campaigns
against television violence have appeared with the regularity
of the thirteen-year locust. Senate Judiciary Committee hear-
ings on juvenile delinquency in the mid-1950s and early 1960s
examined the effects of television on young people; in the
mid-1970s, both Congress and the FCC again expressed con-
cerns about depictions of violence on TV. This culminated in
the creation of the "family viewing policy" in which the net-
works and the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
agreed to move violent and sexually-oriented programming to
the later evening hours. 9
In recent years, Congress consistently has made statements
against television violence. 0 In 1999, the Subcommittee on Com-
munications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation even conducted hearings on the issue of television
violence. 31 In 2004, thirty-nine members of Congress requested that
the envelope toward more and more questionable content. Increasing numbers of inde-
cency complaints at the FCC demonstrate the public's rising concern.").
26. SeeSurvey of Schools Finds "Epidemic of Violence, "WASH. POST,Jan. 6, 1994, atA6 (stat-
ing the results of a recent survey regarding youth violence); see also Wald, supra note 12, at
402-03 (discussing the implications of the survey).
27. Corn-Revere, supra note 12, at 189 (providing a review of complaints about media
violence).
28. See Calvert, supra note 16 (discussing recent attempts to regulate violent video
games); Kevin Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three Responses to First
Amendment Concerns, 2003 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 51 (same). Although several attempts have
been made to regulate the distribution of violent video games, courts have invalidated all of
the regulations. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (stating that no regulation preventing "the dissemination of violent video
games to children... has passed constitutional muster").
29. Corn-Revere, supra note 12, at 189-90.
30. See, e.g., Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting
Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. Rav. 427, 437 (2000) (discussing statements
made by Senator Robert Byrd against television violence).
31. Hearing, supra note 1.
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the FCC explore the potential regulation of television violence.32
Though these undertakings have not produced any meaningful
legislation, Congressional interest exists to address this issue.
Intensifying acts of juvenile violence have fueled the crusade to
regulate violence in the media. With the rash of school shootings
that continues to occur with surprising regularity, the public has
become greatly concerned with the danger that youth violence
33poses.
B. Measures Proposed to Regulate Television Violence
Because of the constant crusade against media violence, at-
tempts to regulate the entertainment industry are numerous, and a
complete recounting is impossible. However, a general statement
of attempts to regulate violence and discussion of two recent Con-
gressional attempts to regulate television violence will provide a
context for the issues relating to regulating television violence.
Legislative attempts to regulate television violence generally
come in several different forms: 1) a complete ban on the broad-
cast of violent materials; 2) regulation of violence to certain hours
of the day; 3) labeling, rating, and outside monitoring require-
ments designed so that adults can easily recognize offensive
speech; and 4) technological devices that block the offending
signals from being received.34 Moreover, politicians have been will-
ing to use the threat of legislation as a means of obtaining
self-regulation from the industry.35 Self-regulation measures often
include the following: 1) limiting violent programs to certain hours
of the day; 2) adopting labels, ratings, and outside monitoring;
32. See Robert Corn-Revere, Regulating TV Violence: The FCC's National Rorschach Test,
COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 1 (discussing the Congressional mandate that the FCC explore
the issue of television violence). Ultimately, the FCC sought comment from a wide variety of
individuals on issues such as the effects of viewing violent programming, the role of the V-
chip, and possible regulatory solutions. See Violent Television Programming and Its Impact
on Children, 19 F.C.C.R. 14394 (July 28, 2004) (notice of inquiry).
33. See, e.g., Tom Weber, Youth Killers Warned Us; We Didn't Act, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 24, 2005, at B1 ("Now a place called Red Lake[, Minn.) is added to that tragically long
list of infamous American school-massacre sites that includes West Paducah, Ky.; Pearl, Miss.;
Springfield, Ore.; Jonesboro, Ark.; and Littleton, Colo., where Eric Harris and Dylan Kle-
bold killed 13 people and themselves six years ago at Columbine High School."); supra note
4 and accompanying text.
34. See Corn-Revere, supra note 12, at 193-94 (listing various means of regulating tele-
vision violence); Schneider, supra note 12, at 502-18 (discussing and analyzing various
methods of regulating television violence).
35. Corn-Revere, supra note 12, at 193-94 (discussing lawmakers' threat of legislation
as a method for obtaining self-regulation of violence by the television industry).
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3) conducting viewer education programs; and 4) presenting pro-
grams to address violence in society.
31
Recent efforts to regulate the broadcast media include the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. This Act represents one of the most
broadly sweeping regulations of the broadcast media to date. It in-
cludes provisions requiring the adoption of a rating system for
television shows and requiring that new television sets be equipped
with technology, known as the "V-chip," to allow parents to block
certain unwanted television programs.3 s The success of these provi-
sions in blocking unwanted programming has been hotly
debated,3 9 but the implications this Act may have on the constitu-
tionality of the "safe harbor" regulation of television violence are
40numerous.
Also of particular interest in the regulation of television violence
is a bill recently presented by Senator Ernest Hollings of South
Carolina that would have actually instituted "safe harbor" regula-
tion for television violence.4' Prior to his recent retirement,
Senator Hollings had been a consistent proponent of this type of
regulation and had previously presented similar legislation. The
Senate held hearings regarding the bill,4' but Congress never held
a vote to enact the proposed legislation. However, the fact that
this legislation has been seriously discussed demonstrates that
Congress is amenable to and may pass "safe harbor" regulation at
some point in the future.
36. See id. (reporting on the self-regulation that the cable industry has undertaken).
37. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.).
38. Id., § 551 (b)(1), 110 Stat. at 139 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)-(x)
(2000)).
39. See generally Ferenchak, supra note 18 (discussing the implications of the V-chip
provision).
40. See infra Part VA.
41. See Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act, S. 161, 108th Cong.
(2003) (containing legislation to regulate television violence to certain hours of the day).
42. See Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act, S. 341, 107th Cong.
(2001) (containing legislation to regulate television violence to certain hours of the day);
Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act, S. 876, 106th Cong. (1999) (same);
Tom Long, Sex and Violence in Entertainment: Can Parents Win?, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 28,
2000, at B1 (reporting on the attempts of Senator Hollings to legislate "safe harbor" regula-
tion of television violence).
43. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 5-6 (prepared testimony of Robert Corn-Revere, Ad-
junct Professor, Institute of Communications Law, Columbus School of Law) (examining the
"safe harbor" regulation of television violence).
44. The legislation ultimately was incorporated into the Broadcast Decency Enforce-
ment Act of 2004, S. 2056, 108th Cong. (2004).
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Although multiple ways exist to regulate television violence,45
"safe harbor" regulation proves particularly interesting from a First
Amendment standpoint. First, "safe harbor" regulation does not
constitute a complete prohibition of television violence. 6 Although
the Supreme Court has been wary of validating time, place, and
manner restrictions for content-based regulation of speech,47 the
Court has been most permissive of allowing these restrictions in
the broadcast context.4 Second, "safe harbor" regulation of televi-
sion violence mirrors the same type of regulation that the Supreme
Court has already validated in cases regarding indecent material.49
Because "safe harbor" regulation has been used to balance the in-
terests of the state and broadcasters in the past, the Court might be
agreeable to this type of regulation of television violence.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S STANCE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATING
BROADCAST MATERIALS
Although First Amendment law entails a complex and vast web
of opinions that in many cases represent five-to-four divisions of
the Court, the majority of significant First Amendment litigation
has occurred only within the past one hundred years.5 Prior to the
twentieth century, many believed that the First Amendment ap-
plied solely to prior restraints on speech, and that once the speech
45. See Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 743-
55 (1999) (considering self-regulation as a means for addressing the issue of television vio-
lence); Corn-Revere, supra note 12, at 190-94 (reporting on a variety of methods for
controlling television violence); Schneider, supra note 12, at 502-18 (discussing advisories,
ratings, parental lock out devices, and a variety of other measures to control television vio-
lence).
46. See Ballard, supra note 12, at 213-14 (examining "zoning" in comparison to an
across-the-board" restrictions on television violence).
47. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1989) (discussing Supreme
Court precedent regarding time, place, and manner restrictions).
48. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (validating a time, place,
and manner restriction for indecent materials in broadcast media).
49. See, e.g., id.
50. But see Hearing, supra note 1, at 6-10 (prepared testimony of Robert Corn-Revere,
Adjunct Professor, Institute of Communications Law, Columbus School of Law) (discussing
the constitutional difficulties that arise from regulating television violence on broadcast
channels to "safe harbor" hours).
51. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1022 (13th
ed. 1997) (recounting the development of First Amendment doctrine).
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was articulated in public it could still be punished without violating
the Constitution.2
It was not until 1919, in the landmark case of Schenck v. United
States,53 that Justice Holmes-speaking for a unanimous Court-
conceded that "[i]t may be that the prohibition of laws abridging
the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, al-
though to prevent them may have been the main purpose .... ,,51 It
was only after this statement that the Court began to expand and
explore the intricacies of the First Amendment. In fact, the Court
did not decide the seminal case in First Amendment regulation of
the broadcast media, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, until 1978. 5.
This section will analyze the contours of constitutionally permis-
sible regulation of broadcast media. This analysis will proceed
through an examination of the criteria used for assessing the con-
stitutionality of content-based regulation and an examination of
the standard of review used in applying these criteria.
A. Criteria for Assessing the Constitutionality of Regulating Speech
The First Amendment declares, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech .... ,,6 Although this statement
appears to be a per se rule against any sort of regulation of speech,
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that regulation of speech
is permissible in a variety of circumstances. Historically, for exam-
ple, bribery, perjury, and counseling to murder have been
considered so clearly unprotected by the First Amendment that
prohibitions of these types of speech have gone unlitigatedY. In
terms of litigated restraints, speech interfering with rights
52. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (demonstrating the Supreme
Court's initial position that the First Amendment protected against only prior restraints on
speech).
53. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
54. Id. at 51-52 (discussing the Court's current opinions on the applicability of the
First Amendment to the regulation of speech).
55. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1975) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment is applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
57. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 1022.
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guaranteed in the Constitution 8 and speech with little to no sub-
stantive value 9 have been barred in a variety of situations.
The general criteria for proving the constitutionality of content-
based regulation of speech consist of demonstrating that a compel-
ling state interest in regulating the speech outweighs the interest in
protecting the right to express it,60 showing that the regulation of
speech is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest,
61
and showing that no viable, less restrictive alternative for achieving
the state's interest exists. 62 Subsequent sections will analyze each of
these issues in the context of the constitutionality of regulating
television violence on broadcast channels. Before that occurs,
however, it is important to consider what standard of review the
Court will use in determining the constitutionality of any attempt
to regulate television violence.
B. Standard of Review for a First Amendment Claim
Although Supreme Court precedent has made clear that the First
Amendment prohibition on restriction of speech is not absolute, the
Supreme Court has almost consistently held that content-based
regulations will be subject to strict scrutiny. In many cases, this
means that regulations, even if they may be justified in some man-
ner, will still not pass constitutional muster after being "strictly
scrutinized" by the Court. 64 When the Court does employ strict scru-
tiny in a First Amendment case, the government can still prevail if it
can show that compelling interests for the regulation exist and that
the regulation is the only possible means of achieving the interests.
65
58. See infra Part IV (discussing instances in which free speech was trumped by consti-
tutionally protected rights, i.e., parental authority over the upbringing of one's children and
privacy in one's home).
59. See infra Part III.B.2 (examining speech that is not protected by the First Amend-
ment because it has little value in the free exchange of ideas).
60. See infra Part III.A.
61. See infta Part V.B.
62. See infra Part V.A.
63. See RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S 377, 395-96 (1992) (providing analysis of the
Court's application of strict scrutiny to content-based regulations of speech); see also Ross,
supra note 30, at 432 (explaining that strict scrutiny is generally applied in First Amendment
cases).
64. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (discussing the
level of scrutiny employed by the Court when First Amendment rights are challenged).
65. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (discussing the criteria for as-
sessing a First Amendment claim).
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In this subsection, the factors contributing to the level of scru-
tiny that the Court will apply in assessing the constitutionality of
any regulation of violence on broadcast television will be examined
through a review of the Court's treatment of content-based versus
content-neutral regulation, protected versus unprotected speech,
and regulation of the broadcast medium. Although content-based
regulations are usually "strictly scrutinized" by the Supreme Court,
the level of scrutiny may be reduced if television violence is not a
form of speech that receives full First Amendment protection or if
television violence in the broadcast media receives less First
Amendment protection than speech in other media.
1. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Regulation-The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized a greater danger in de jure, con-
tent-based regulation of speech rather than de facto, content-
neutral regulation. In cases of content-based regulation, the Court
reviews the regulation with strict scrutiny to validate intentional
abridgment of the freedom to convey the content of speech be-
cause of concerns about irrevocable damage to liberty and the
democratic spirit.66 If the regulation is content-neutral, however,
the Court will likely review the regulation with only intermediate
scrutiny.67
The test for delineating between content-based and content-
neutral regulation consists of whether the regulation is aimed at
the communicative impact of the speech, i.e., content-based, or is
incidental and ancillary to some other non-communicative regula-
tion by the state, i.e., content-neutral. Determining whether a
regulation by the state is content-based or content-neutral is often
S • 68
a complicated task. For example, in Cohen v. California, Cohen was
charged with violating a statute that prohibited "maliciously and
willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or
person ... by ... offensive conduct" for wearing a coat bearing the
words "fuck the draft."69 Although at first glance the statute might
66. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 1025-29 (explaining the philosophic
justifications for the protection of free speech).
67. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1988) (upholding an ordinance prohib-
iting picketing on a sidewalk in front of any individual's residence or dwelling because the
ordinance was content-neutral and passed intermediate scrutiny). To survive intermediate
scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
nificant government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.
Id.; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation requiring cable broadcasters to devote a specified
portion of their channels to the transmission of local commercial and public broadcast sta-
tions).
68. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
69. Id. at 16.
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seem to have the content-neutral goal of protecting the peace, the
Court held that the regulation was applied in a content-based
manner because Cohen's conviction under the statute rested upon
the communicative impact of the words he used to convey his mes-
sage, rather than any separately identifiable conduct. ° Obviously,
the difficulty in determining the content-based or content-neutral
status of a regulation can be substantial.
Strict scrutiny, however, is not always fatal to content-based regula-
tions. For example, in Burson v. Freeman,7' a plurality of four Justices
upheld a statute that made it illegal to solicit votes or display cam-
paign materials within one hundred feet of a place of voting. Even
though the regulation was content-based, the plurality held that the
state had a compelling interest to protect citizens' right to vote freely
for issues or candidates of their choice, and that the ban was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve this interest.
72
Considering that the Bill of Rights was initially drafted as a re-
sponse to citizens' fears of encroachment of liberty,73 the Court's
strict scrutiny of content-based regulations seems logical. In fact,
courts closely scrutinize even content-neutral regulations. For in-
stance, in Schneider v. State,74 city ordinances forbidding the
distribution of leaflets to reduce litter were struck down on First
Amendment grounds because although the prohibitions were con-
tent-neutral in their aims, less restrictive means existed of achieving
the same goals, such as punishing only those who litter.75
In terms of the regulation of violence on broadcast television, the
Court will most likely view any regulation as content-based in spite of
any phraseology in the actual legislation. In cases involving the regu-
lation of speech, the government is likely to claim that a regulation
is content-neutral to try to avoid the more exacting level of strict
scrutiny that is employed for content-based regulations. In United
70. See id. at 24-26. "The only conduct which the state sought to punish was the fact of
communication." Id. at 18.
71. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
72. Id. at 200 ("While we readily acknowledge that a law rarely survives [strict] scrutiny,
an examination of the evolution of election reform, both in this country and abroad, dem-
onstrates the necessity of restricted areas in or around polling places.").
73. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 418 (stating that the amendments com-
posing the Bill of Rights were introduced during the first session of Congress in response to
a "widespread demand for constitutional protection of individual ... rights"); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (attempting to address concerns that the Consti-
tution did not contain a bill of rights).
74. 308 U.S. 147 (1938).
75. Id. at 162 (holding that freedom of speech and press should not be burdened be-
cause obvious methods for preventing litter exist, such as punishing those who actually
throw paper on the ground).
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States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,76 however, the Court ruled
that a regulation was content-based that required cable operators to
ensure that indecent or sexually explicit programming on channels
primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented material be either fully
scrambled or played between the hours of 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.77
The Court reached this holding because the provision singled out
particular programming content and particular programmers.78 Al-
though Playboy focused on "safe harbor" regulation of indecency on
cable television, the fact that the Court found the regulation to be
content-based and subject to strict scrutiny means that regulating
television violence to "safe harbor" hours will likely be subject to the
same high level of scrutiny because any regulation of television vio-
lence would focus on particular programming content. Whether the
"safe harbor" regulation deals with indecency or violence, the focus
of the regulation is the same, i.e., the content of the speech.
2. Protected Versus Unprotected Speech-Based on the criteria for as-
sessing the constitutionality of regulating speech, the Court has held
that certain categories of speech do not merit the same First
Amendment protection as other forms of speech,79 and thus, deserve
a lower degree of scrutiny by the Court. An analysis must be under-
taken to determine whether television violence fits into one of these
categories of unprotected speech or whether television violence
should receive the "strictly scrutinized" balancing afforded to other
forms of protected speech.
The types of speech that receive the least First Amendment
protection s  are obscenity,8' advocacy of imminent lawless
76. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
77. Id. at 811-12.
78. Id.
79. A recurrent issue in First Amendment scholarship is whether the protection of
speech should be analyzed in terms of categorization or balancing. See GUNTHER & SULLI-
VAN, supra note 51, at 1032-33 (explaining the debate between the categorization of speech
or balancing of interests in First Amendment claims). Categorization seeks to establish
"bright line" rules about which forms of speech are protected and which are not, while bal-
ancing evaluates the interests involved and the merits of the proposed regulation. Id. A full
analysis of the issue is beyond the scope of this text. Therefore, it is assumed for present
purposes that balancing is the correct interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and that
balancing interests, in fact, yields categories of unprotected speech.
80. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (limiting unprotected
speech to categories such as obscenity, advocacy of imminent lawless behavior, fighting
words, defamation, and fraudulent misrepresentation).
81. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not
protected by the First Amendment). In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court held that the
test for obscenity requires inquiry into:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
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behavior,s2 fighting words, 3 defamation," and fraudulent misrepre-
sentation.85 The main test for delineating between protected and
unprotected speech consists of whether the speech can be valued
in the context of social dialogue. 8 Speech that lacks such value in
the free exchange of ideas is deemed unprotected. 7 For example,
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,ss the Supreme Court held that the
defendant could be convicted under a broadly worded statute8 9 for
calling a city marshal a "damned racketeer" and "damned fascist"
because the speech had "slight social value as a step to truth."90
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01
(1987) (applying the Miller test). Child pornography may be regulated even without satisfy-
ing the Miller test because of the state's compelling interest in protecting children. See, e.g.,
New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982) (holding that the state has great leeway in
regulating child pornography).
82. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that incitement to
"imminent lawless action" is not protected speech). The state cannot forbid advocating
violation of the law unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447.
83. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that "fighting
words" are not protected speech). The Supreme Court has defined the term "fighting words"
as "epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of
the peace." Id. at 574. Regulations aimed at fighting words are often held to be unconstitu-
tional for overbreadth and/or vagueness. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130,
132 (1974) (invalidating a New Orleans ordinance on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness
for making it unlawful "to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or
with reference to any member of the city police while in actual performance of his duty");
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972) (invalidating a Georgia statue on grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness for making it a misdemeanor to "use to or of another, ... oppro-
brious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace").
84. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("There is no constitu-
tional value in false statements of fact.").
85. Id.
86. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (holding that no constitutional protection exists for
"utterances [that] are no[t an] essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality").
87. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (discussing the unprotected
status of speech deemed to lack value in the free exchange of ideas).
88. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
89. The statute read:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or de-
risive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with
intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful
business or occupation.
Id.
90. Id. at 572.
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Of course, it would be difficult to claim that delineating between
protected and unprotected speech based on whether the speech
has "social value as a step to truth" provides a "bright line" rule for
the determining the status of speech. Therefore, analyzing how the
Court may approach a particular regulation of speech can be diffi-
cult.
Although it was once viewed that unprotected speech receives
only "mere rationality" review, rather than strict scrutiny, the Su-
preme Court seems to have abandoned this position and defaulted
to strict scrutiny in cases of unprotected speech. In R.A. V v. City of
St. Paul, for example, the Court employed strict scrutiny and in-
validated a city ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to "place[]
on public or private property... a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses an-
ger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender."'91 The Court felt that the city should not
have differentiated between racially based "fighting words" and
other categories of "fighting words."9" However, obscenity, advocacy
of imminent lawless behavior, fighting words, defamation, and
fraudulent misrepresentation all pose obvious dangers to society.
Thus, even if the Court imposes strict scrutiny in the context of the
unprotected categories of speech, it would not be per se fatal.
It is unlikely that television violence falls into one of the unpro-
tected categories of speech. 93 In Winters v. New York, 94 although not
speaking specifically on the regulation of television violence, the
Court invalidated a state law designed to prohibit the production,
distribution, and sale of publications primarily dedicated to stories
of bloodshed and crime. In that case, the Court penned the oft-
quoted language, "What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any possible
value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to
the protection of free speech as the best of literature." 9 Although
91. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
92. Id.
93. See Corn-Revere, supra note 32, at 27-28 (suggesting that violent images should not
receive the more limited First Amendment protection afforded to obscene or indecent ma-
terials).
94. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
95. Id. at 510 (demonstrating a commitment by the Court to protect depictions of
violence in the media); see also Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1199 (9th
Cir. 1989) (refusing to create a new category of unprotected speech for non-obscene
pornography because of its alleged violent content); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng,
325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("[D]epictions [of violence] have been used
in literature, art, and the media to convey important messages throughout our history, and
there is no indication that such expressions have ever been excluded from the protection of
the First Amendment or subject to government regulation.").
FALL 2005]
18 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
this case is from the 1940s and may not reflect the current state of
the law, it stands as one of the few Supreme Court cases to address
the issue of regulating depictions of violence.
More recently, in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut,96 the
Seventh Circuit, affirmed in memorandum by the Supreme Court,
held that indecent sexually oriented material could not be regu-
lated on the ground that it depicted violence against women
because "violence on television ... is protected as speech, however
insidious."97 Although the Seventh Circuit's holding might have
some limits if broadcasters began televising extreme acts of vio-
lence, Hudnut stands for proposition that the type of television
violence currently televised is protected speech under the First
Amendment.
Even if a regulation is held to involve protected speech, strict
scrutiny will not necessarily be fatal to regulating television vio-
lence for the following two reasons. First, even when speech is
protected, the regulation may still be valid if the government can
demonstrate a compelling state interest in regulating the speech
that outweighs the interest in protecting the right to free speech.98
And the government can show that the regulation is narrowly tai-
lored to meet the compelling state interests" with no viable less
restrictive alternatives for achieving these interests. °° Second, the
Court has afforded the government leniency in regulating broad-
cast speech because of the pervasive nature of the medium.'0 '
3. Regulation of the Broadcast Medium--Although the drafters of
any regulation of television violence will likely receive some leni-
ency from the Court, it is probable that any regulation will still be
"strictly scrutinized." In instances of content-based regulation by
the state, the Court has generally held that the state may not claim
in defense of the regulation that the speaker can articulate the
message in some other place, some other time, or some other
96. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
97. Id. at 330 (speaking in dicta of the First Amendment protection of violence on
television); see alsoJames v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 695-99 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating
in dicta that the First Amendment prevents tort liability based on distribution of violent
media because communication with violent content is protected speech); Wilson v. Midway
Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 178-82 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding that the First Amend-
ment protected a producer of a violent video game for wrongful death allegedly caused by
the game); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279-81 (D. Colo. 2002)
(dismissing an action based on alleged liability for distributing violent video games and
movies because the expressive content of games and movies is protected speech).
98. See supra Part III.A.
99. See infra Part V.B.
100. See infra Part V.A.
101. See infra Part III.B.3.
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manner.0 2 In essence, once the state is seen as objecting to speech
via a time, place, or manner regulation, this is considered signifi-
cant enough to invalidate the regulation on First Amendment
grounds.
Under this analysis, it might appear that "safe harbor" regulation
of television violence on broadcast channels is a per se violation of
the First Amendment because the regulation would be a time,
place, and manner restriction and, as stated earlier, a content-
based regulation.0 3 In broadcast cases, however, the Supreme
Court has created a special exception to its general prohibition on
time, place, and manner restrictions for content-based regula-
tions. 1 4 In fact, the Court is more lenient with legislators in the
broadcast context.
10 5
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the seminal case examining regula-
tion of broadcast media, the Supreme Court examined the
rationales for granting leniency to the government in regulating
broadcast speech.0 6 In Pacifica, the Court affirmed that a twelve-
minute broadcast containing filthy words played on a radio station
during daytime hours was not protected by the First Amendment
based on three distinct rationales: the ease of exposure, the inade-
quacy of content warnings, and extremely detrimental nature of
the initial exposure.'0 7
In granting some leniency in regulating broadcast speech, the
Court was especially concerned with the ease of exposure to harm-
ful materials. Unlike internete5 and indecent phone services' °9
("dial-a-porn") cases in which the Court has not granted as much
deference to the government in regulating speech, broadcast
speech affords viewers and listeners easy access to harmful material
with just an accidental touch of a button."0 It requires neither the
102. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 879 (2000) (invalidating
a "safe harbor" regulation in the context of cable television in part because it constituted a
time, place, and manner restriction).
103. See supra Part III.B.1.
104. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 879; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
105. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 ("[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcast-
ing that has received the most limited First Amendment protection.").
106. See id. at 748-49.
107. See id. (stating the rationales for a lower degree of scrutiny in cases regarding the
regulation of broadcast speech); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (applying
the Pacifica analysis).
108. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867 (holding that the internet receives full First
Amendment protection unlike the broadcast media).
109. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989) (holding that
unlike indecent phone services, the broadcast media has unique characteristics that warrant
lesser First Amendment protection).
110. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844; Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
896 F.2d 780, 784 (3d Cir. 1990).
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sophistication nor the level of purposefulness that other media,
e.g., internet or dial-a-porn, demand to gain access. As Justice
Stevens put it in Pacifica,
Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the
young without restricting the expression at its source. Book-
stores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be
prohibited from making indecent material available to chil-
dren .... The ease with which children may obtain access to
broadcast material ... amply justifjies] special treatment of
indecent broadcasting."'
The Court also stated that the inadequacy of content warnings
justified granting leniency to the government in the regulation of
broadcast speech. The Court understood that with the flip of a dial
exposure to harmful material might occur with broadcast media.
As Justice Stevens wrote,
To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One
may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does
not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm
that has already taken place. 112
Thus, the Court has held that no level of warning can protect a
viewer and/or listener from the initial exposure to offending ma-
terial.
Finally, in granting a leniency in regulation of broadcast speech,
the Court understood that it is the initial exposure that can be the
most detrimental because the loss of innocence of a listener or
viewer is instantaneous. 3 As the Court wrote in Pacifica, "Pacifica's
broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant.""4
As held in Pacifica, a lower level of scrutiny is used in evaluating
the regulation of indecency on broadcast television."' The Su-
preme Court acknowledged that different media have different
degrees of accessibility, and that the free speech interests in allow-
ing indecent materials to be broadcast twenty-four hours a day,
111. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
112. Id. at 748-49.
113. See id. at 749.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 748 ("[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received
the most limited First Amendment protection.").
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seven days a week do not overcome the compelling government
interests to protect children, retain parental control over the
home, and protect the right to privacy from unwanted intrusion in
the home, because with the flip of a switch, the damage of broad-
casted indecent materials is done. 116
The Court has been reluctant to state the specific level of review
in regulating indecency in broadcast speech. In broadcast cases,
the Court has applied relaxed scrutiny, which falls well below the
demands of strict scrutiny.117 In United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc.," 8 howeverJustice Kennedy, speaking for a majority that
included Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsberg, seemed
to turn away from this relaxed scrutiny in any context and stated
that content-based speech restrictions will always be subject to strict
scrutiny." 9 It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy was speaking spe-
cifically about the level of scrutiny for cable television or was
making a general statement regarding both cable and broadcast
speech. 20 In any event, no matter what level of scrutiny is applied,
it is likely that the drafters of any regulation of television violence
would receive some leniency from the Court because of the nature
of the broadcast medium.
Of course, the amount of leniency is uncertain. Although argu-
ments can be made for and against violence being treated in the
same manner as indecency in the broadcast context, it is likely that
any regulation of television violence would be subject to strict scru-
tiny. Regulating television violence would create a fundamental
change in society, 2' and defining harmful violence for purposes of
regulation would be extremely difficult. 2  The arguments for and
against applying the same reduced scrutiny in the broadcast con-
text for regulation of violence and regulation of sexually explicit
material are examined below.
a. The Case for Applying Reduced Scrutiny to Regulation of Broadcast
Violence-The case for applying the same reduced scrutiny to regu-
lation of violence and sexually explicit material is based upon
116. See id. at 748-49.
117. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
118. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
119. Id. at 813.
120. Id. A few lines later, Justice Kennedy grouped both cable and broadcast speech to-
gether stating: "Cable television, like broadcast media, presents unique problems, which
inform our assessment of the interests at stake, and which may justify restrictions that would
be unacceptable in other contexts." Id. (citations omitted).
121. See infra text accompanying notes 135-137 (discussing how regulation of television
violence could represent a fundamental change in the entertainment and information avail-
able to the people of the United States).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 138-141.
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concerns about the pervasiveness of broadcasting, comparable
compelling interests regarding the effects of television violence
and sexually explicit material, and apprehension about increased
violence in the United States.
Broadcast media is pervasive in nature. Regardless of the subject
matter in question, regulators must contend with the ease of expo-
sure, the inadequacy of content warnings, and extremely
detrimental nature of initial exposure. Pacifica can be viewed as a
statement on how the Court will treat the broadcast media in gen-
eral, rather than a specific statement about how the Court will treat
indecency. In fact, the Court's rationales for reduced scrutiny are
equally compelling for any type of speech transmitted via the
broadcast media. The argument can be made that the level of scru-
tiny for the broadcast media should not be altered simply because
the type of speech changes. The pervasiveness of broadcast media
is constant no matter the content of the speech.
The same level of scrutiny is arguably warranted for broadcast
media regulation of violence and sexually explicit material because
the compelling interests are the same in both instances. As the
next section will discuss, the Court has cited the protection of chil-
dren, the preservation of parental authority over the home, and
the protection of privacy in the home, as compelling government
interests that can outweigh the interest in protecting the right to
free speech in the context of indecent material.' 23 If these interests
can be shown to exist in the broadcasting of violent material, the
Court may use a commensurate level of reduced scrutiny.
The case for the regulation of violence and sexually explicit ma-
terial being given comparable reduced scrutiny can also be based
on increased youth violence in American society. As school shoot-
ings within the past decade have shown, violence among
adolescents and juveniles is now taking on ever more alarming
forms. 124 With the increased ease of communication throughout
the world, greater concern must be given to the types of messages
to which individuals-especially children-are being exposed.2
Although indecent sexual materials may pose threats, such as in-
creased pregnancy and continued spread of sexually transmitted
diseases, the horrific acts of violence committed by juveniles in the
past decade may prove to be an equally substantial danger to soci-
ety.126 The Supreme Court could give the regulation of violence
123. See infra Part IVA-C.
124. See supra note 16.
125. See id.
126. See Kim, supra note 12, at 1390-91 (containing an analysis of "safe harbor" regula-
tion of indecent broadcasting).
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and sexually explicit material comparable reduced scrutiny be-
cause each type of speech poses a substantial harm to society.
b. The Case Against Applying Reduced Scrutiny to Regulation of
Broadcast Violence-However, the case against comparable scrutiny
for broadcast media regulation of violence and sexually explicit
material is likely more compelling. Regulation of violence is likely
to be treated differently than regulation of indecent materials be-
cause of the probable narrowness of the Pacifica holding, the
greater historical acceptance of violence as entertainment, and the
difficulty in defining violence. Pacifica likely will be interpreted
narrowly as holding that leniency to the government applies only
in regulating indecent broadcasting.1 27 In fact, the case law seems
to support the contention that indecent and violent programs are
not treated the same. In Winters v. New York,128 for example, the
Court held that magazines primarily depicting acts of violence
were "as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best
of literature." 29 This statement suggests that the Court will be ad-
verse to granting broadcast regulation of violence the same
reduced scrutiny as broadcast regulation of sexually explicit mate-
rials.
On the other hand, the argument can be made that the Court
should not be viewed as speaking to any level of scrutiny for regula-
tion of broadcast media because Winters dealt only with the print
media and did not consider broadcast television.'2 0 More recent
circuit court cases, however, have suggested that depictions of vio-
lence receive greater protection under the First Amendment than
indecent speech. As mentioned previously, 3' in American Booksellers
Association, Inc. v. Hudnut,13 the Seventh Circuit held that indecent
sexually oriented material could not be regulated on the grounds
that it depicted violence against women because "violence on tele-
vision ... is protected as speech, however insidious."13 Under the
Seventh Circuit's analysis, regulation of television violence would
not get the same decreased level of strict scrutiny that the regula-
tion of sexually indecent material receives.
134
127. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (containing an analysis of
indecent broadcasting).
128. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
129. Id. at 510.
130. Id. at 507.
131. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
132. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mere., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
133. Id. at 330.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97 (discussing cases where communication
with violent content was protected speech under the First Amendment).
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Moreover, regulation of television violence likely will not get the
same level of reduced scrutiny as regulation of television indecency
because historically, violence has been a much more accepted form
of entertainment. Cartoons, news, sports, and a variety of other
regularly broadcast programming all contain some level of vio-
lence.'3 5 In Pacifica, the case turned on whether a few words and
acts, which had already been taboo to broadcast, could be pre-
vented from being broadcast.3 6 In the case of regulating violence
on television to certain "safe harbor" hours of the day, this would
represent a fundamental change in the entertainment and infor-
mation available to the people of the United States.13 7 Thus, the
regulation of violence on television likely will be treated differently
than the regulation of sexually explicit materials because Pacifica
defended the status quo of not allowing indecent materials on
broadcast television, while the regulation of violence on broadcast
television would substantially alter American culture. Although this
does not mean that the regulation of violence on broadcast
television to "safe harbor" hours will be considered per se unconsti-
tutional, it does suggest that the Court may use a much more
exacting form of scrutiny because it represents such a fundamental
change in society.
Furthermore, the Court would likely not give the regulation of
violence on television the same reduced degree of scrutiny because
of the difficulty in defining the types of violence to be regulated.38
Because cartoons, news, sports, and a variety of other regularly
broadcast programming all contain some level of violence, the
choices made in deciding which types of violence should be regu-
lated will undoubtedly be tremendously difficult and controversial.
3 9
In fact, it is not even clear that the Court will accept that television
violence poses a threat to society. For instance, in Eclipse Enterprises v.
135. Cf Bradley, supra note 2, at 47-48 (stating that some television violence may cause
children to pause to contemplate the consequences of their actions); Deutsch, supra note
12, at 1101-06 (claiming that many types of violence on television are not harmful to chil-
dren); David Foldenflik, Can TV Violence Be Good for You, L.A. TiMES, July 29, 2000, at F15
(reporting the possibility that certain lessons learned from television violence may be bene-
ficial).
136. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
137. See Wald, supra note 12, at 419 ("[Tjhe vast array of programs containing some vio-
lence also contain history, literature, documentary, sports, news or even good storytelling.");
supra Part II.A. (discussing the constant presence of violence as entertainment throughout
history).
138. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
139. See Wald, supra note 12, at 420 ("The thorniest problem in any control system [to
regulate television violence]-by whomever administered-is deciding what violence is to be
screened out.... [S]o many aspects of our life and society do involve violence that it inevi-
tably must be reflected in our art and forms of entertainment.").
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Gullotta,40 the Second Circuit ruled that a ban on trading cards de-
picting violent acts was unconstitutional because it was neither
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest, nor was it
possible to prove the link between the trading cards and increases
in crime. 14' That case highlights the difficulty in defining violence
narrowly enough to encompass only violence that will be viewed as
detrimental.
In sum, the Court likely will "strictly scrutinize" any regulation of
television violence because it would be a content-based regulation
of protected speech and would constitute a fundamental change to
the information and entertainment available to the American pub-
lic. The Court likely will grant some leniency to the drafters of any
regulation of television violence in determining its constitutional-
ity. However, it is unlikely that the regulation of violence will
receive as low a level of scrutiny as regulation of indecency on
broadcast television because of the probable narrowness of the
Pacifica holding, the greater historical acceptance of violence as
entertainment, and the difficulty in defining violence.
IV. POSSIBLE COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS FOR
REGULATING TELEVISION VIOLENCE
As stated previously, the general criteria for proving the constitu-
tionality of a regulation of speech consists of demonstrating that a
compelling state interest for the regulation outweighs the interest
in protecting the speech. Then, the state must show that no viable
less restrictive alternatives for achieving the compelling interest
exist and demonstrate that the regulation of speech is narrowly
tailored to meet the interest. 142
This section will explore a number of the state's possible com-
pelling interests for regulating television violence. Based on a
review of Supreme Court precedent, it is likely that the govern-
ment will claim a compelling interest in protecting children,
preserving parental liberty in the upbringing of children, and pro-
tecting privacy in the home. These possible compelling interests
are examined below.
140. 134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 71 (GriesaJ., concurring).
142. See supra Part III.A.
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A. The Compelling Interest in Protecting Children
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,143 the Supreme
Court held that there is "a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors."" Sable provides
only one of many examples of the Court's dedication to protecting
children.14 In Sable, the Court was firm in its conviction that chil-
dren must be protected from easily obtainable indecent materials,
and held that a "blanket restriction" requiring access codes to re-
ceive indecent messages ("dial-a-porn") was unconstitutional only
because of the numerous and complicated steps that had to occur
to obtain these phone messages."' Sable differs significantly from
the regulation of violence on broadcast television because Sable
regarded only "dial-a-porn," rather than broadcast regulation. The
availability and access to these two types of speech is considerably
different, but Sable demonstrates that the Court allows the protec-
tion of children to be a compelling justification that can outweigh
the interest in protecting the right to free speech.
In the case of violence on broadcast television, arguments for
the protection of children'47 are often based on the correlation be-
tween violent broadcasts and violent behavior, the desensitization
to violence caused by these broadcasts, and the degradation in mo-
rality that exposure to violence can yield.14 The existence of a
correlation between violent broadcasts and violent behavior is a
143. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
144. See id. at 126 (containing the Court's analysis of why protecting children is a com-
pellingjustification).
145. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743
(1997) (discussing the protection of children from indecent programming on cable televi-
sion); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (discussing protecting children
from indecent speech in broadcast media).
146. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28 (1989) (finding that different degrees of accessibility
of media yield differing degrees of scrutiny by the Court).
147. Although the analysis in this section may be equally applicable to the protection of
society in general, it is highly unlikely that the Court would validate a prohibition of content-
based speech in the broadcast media on the grounds that the state is protecting adults by
regulating the speech. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) ("It is
well settled that a State or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on materials
available to youths than on those available to adults."); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dal-
las, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968) ("[Blecause of its strong and abiding interest in youth, a State
may regulate the dissemination to juveniles of, and their access to, materials objectionable,
as to them, but which a State could not regulate as to adults."). Thus, although the analysis is
applicable to adults, the focus of this subsection will be solely on the protection of children
because this represents a more viable argument for the regulation of violence on broadcast
television to "safe harbor" hours.
148. See Kim, supra note 12, at 1383 (1994) (exploring various justifications that a court
might use in determining the merits of regulating television violence).
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point of severe division among experts who study the effects of
broadcast television on children.14 9 At one end of the spectrum are
experts who claim an undeniable link between television violence
and violent behavior,150 and at the other are experts who claim the
exact opposite. 5' Whether "safe harbor" regulation of television
violence will pass constitutional muster may turn on which experts
the Court believes.
Even if there is not causation between television violence and
violent behavior, one can still argue that the desensitization to vio-
lence caused by these broadcasts yields a culture that is more
accepting and more susceptible to violence. The best evidence for
the desensitizing effects of violence in the media may be the inten-
sifying acts of violence committed by children and adolescents.'
Although this does not prove a direct correlation between desensi-
tization to violence and the media, it may convince the Court that
there is a need for prophylactic measures to prevent the continua-
tion of a culture of violence. The Court may view itself as
protecting children by not allowing them to develop the destruc-
tive tendencies caused by desensitization to violence. 5 '
In fact, members of the Court may adopt the view that violence
in the media yields a general degradation in morality. Some have
argued that exposure to television violence in fact causes psycho-
logical and emotional damage to children that may yield a lack of
concern for others in the world around them. 5 4 This concern has
often been expressed by a fear for the general degradation of the
morality in society, and may be of some concern to the Court in
149. See Corn-Revere, supra note 32, at 24 (discussing the wide spectrum of opinions re-
garding the correlation or lack of correlation between viewing violent television and
undertaking violent behavior).
150. See Khalili, supra note 12, at 225 ("The studies and research clearly demonstrate
that excessive violence on televisions detrimentally affects children of all ages, and contrib-
utes to the rising level of violence in this country."); Jane Gallagher, TV. A Force for Good or
Evilk DAILY POST (Liverpool), Mar. 14, 2005, at 10 ("A long-term study carried out in the
1980s found that the amount of television violence watched at a young age predicted the
level of aggressiveness in later life."); Curtis Ivery, Television and Youth Violence, MICH.
CHRON., July 6, 2004, at 6 ("Studies confirm that young people who watch more than an
hour a day are four times more likely to be violent as young adults than those who watch
less.").
151. See supra note 135.
152. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v.
Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the harm caused by violent video
games is "implausible, at best wildly speculative").
153. See Khalili, supra note 12, at 219-22 (explaining the widespread effects of violent
programming in society).
154. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 12, at 486 ("A[n] . . .effect of television violence,
known as the bystander effect or the desensitization effect, describes the viewer's increased cal-
lousness toward violence directed at others.").
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deciding whether a compelling interest to protect children is pre-
sent to justify regulating television violence.
15
If legislators wish to justify a regulation of television violence
based on protecting children, then they will need to make specific
findings of fact. Legislators must prove causation between violent
broadcast and violent behavior, that violent programming causes
desensitization to violence, or that violent program leads to a deg-
radation of morality.
B. The Compelling Interest in Preserving Parental
Liberty over the Upbringing of Children
Preserving parental authority over the upbringing of children
may be a second compelling justification for "safe harbor" regula-
tion of television violence. In the landmark cases of Meyer v.
Nebraska156 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 57 the Supreme Court held
that the right of dominion over the household and the upbringing
of one's own children is a fundamental liberty in the United States
based on the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5 8
Consistently, the Court has been willing to balance this liberty
with other fundamental rights to maintain parental authority. For
example, in Hodgson v. Minnesota,'59 the Supreme Court affirmed a
waiting period before a minor could exercise her right to an abor-
tion in the interest of allowing parental guidance and discussion of
the implications of the abortion. 60 This demonstrates that the
Court is willing to balance fundamental rights, such as the right to
obtain an abortion, against the liberty of parents.
The rationales for protecting this liberty via the regulation of
broadcast media are based on the same reasons that the broadcast
media is treated differently than other forms of media, i.e., the
ease of exposure, the inadequacy of content warnings, and the ex-
155. Id.
156. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
157. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
158. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that parents have a liberty interest in choos-
ing how their children are educated); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (establishing the fundamental
right to create a home and bring up children).
159. 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990).
160. See id. at 449 ("The 48-hour delay [after parental notification of a minor's inten-
tion to obtain an abortion] imposes only a minimal burden on the right of the minor to
decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
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tremely detrimental nature of the initial exposure. 6' In cases such
as Ginsberg v. New York, the Court has recognized that indecent ma-
terials pose a threat to a parent's liberty in controlling how a child
is raised because indecent materials affect psychological and emo-
tional development.16 2 In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a restriction
against selling indecent magazines to minors based in part on the
notion that it would violate parents' liberty in choosing how their
children are raised.
6 3
With the ease of exposure, the inadequacy of content warnings,
and extremely detrimental nature of the initial exposure to the
broadcast media, the Court has been willing to balance other fun-
damental rights with the compelling interest in preserving parental
authority. As discussed previously, in Pacifica, when a parent heard
a twelve-minute filthy-word broadcast while driving with his child in
the middle of the afternoon, the Court acknowledged that the ini-
tial impact on a child hearing these words made the difference, not
reiterations after the damage had been done. 1 In cases of inde-
cency, the compelling governmental and societal interest is
substantial because exposure to indecent materials may not allow
parents to retain the liberty to raise their children as they see fit.
In regards to regulation of television violence to certain hours
during the day, the liberty of parents to raise their children without
external interference may serve as a compelling justification for
such regulation. As with all forms of broadcast, the power to
"enlarge a child's vocabulary in an instant" and to have substantial
effects on moral, psychological, emotional, religious, social, and
sexual development cannot be understated.' 65 However, the deci-
sion of the Court as to whether television violence is actually
interfering with the fundamental liberty of parents in the upbring-
ing of children will turn on the issues discussed in the previous
subsection regarding the correlation between violent broadcasts
and violent behavior, the desensitization to violence that may be
caused by these broadcasts, and the degradation in morality that
161. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (stating the rationales for a
lower degree of scrutiny in cases regarding the regulation of broadcast speech); see also Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (applying the Pacifica analysis).
162. 390 U.S. 629, 640-42 (1968) (stating concerns about the effects of indecent mate-
rial).
163. Id. at 639 (holding that the liberty of parents in choosing the upbringing of chil-
drenjustifies limiting the availability of sexually explicit materials to minors).
164. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 (demonstrating the Court's concern about the effects
that certain broadcasts may have on children).
165. See id. (examining the effects of exposure to indecent materials, including the
harm of first exposure).
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exposure to violence may yield. 66 Without an answer to these initial
questions, it is impossible to determine whether the Court will find
a compelling justification to allow the regulation of television vio-
lence based on preserving parental authority.
167
C. The Compelling Interest of Protecting Privacy in the Home
A third justification for limitations placed on the broadcast me-
dia may be based on the liberty of an individual to be left alone in
his or her own home. In broadcasting cases, precedent affirms that
the liberty of an individual to be left alone provides a compelling
government interest that may allow for the regulation of speech.
1ee
As held in Pacifica, "[p]atently offensive, indecent material pre-
sented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to
be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder.",69 The Court's treatment of regulating indecency on
broadcast television is similar to the tort of nuisance, because when
indecent material is broadcast, it encroaches on individual prop-
erty rights. In indecency cases, precedent confirms that a balance is
struck within broadcast media between the "safe harbor" hours in
which indecent material may be aired and the daytime hours when
a homeowner and his or her children should be protected.7
Because the available precedent examines only indecency, it is
unclear whether the liberty of the individual to be left alone at
home will prove to be applicable to the regulation of violence on
broadcast television. Again, much will turn on the Court's findings
of fact regarding the existence and severity of the problem created
by television violence. Without understanding the problems cre-
ated by television violence, it is impossible to say whether the Court
will treat indecency and violence comparably. Thus, drafters of any
166. See discussion supra Part IVA.
167. Even if a correlation between violent television and violent behavior is found, the
Court may still invalidate the regulation of violence on broadcast television on other
grounds, such as the availability of less restrictive means to solve the problem and the inabil-
ity to narrowly define "violence" for purposes of regulation. See infra Part V.
168. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50 (evaluating the right of the individual to be left alone
in his or her own home); see also Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38
(1970) (discussing the individual's right to privacy in the home).
169. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (examining the right to privacy in one's own home
from the encroachment of indecent material).
170. SeeAction for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that a reduction of "safe harbor" hours from 10:00 P.M. until 6:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight
until 6:00 A.M. for private broadcasters is unconstitutional).
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regulation of television violence must make specific finding of fact
that television violence is offensive and/or unwanted by a substan-
tial number of Americans.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO THE "SAFE HARBOR"
REGULATION OF VIOLENCE
Tailoring a "safe harbor" regulation of television violence that is
not overly broad or vague will be nearly impossible. Although it is
arguable that no less restrictive means for regulating television vio-
lence exist, defining harmful violence for purposes of regulation
will be extremely difficult.
A. The Availability of Less Restrictive Alternatives to the Regulation
of Television Violence to "Safe Harbor" Hours
A major issue that arises in assessing whether the First
Amendment allows depictions of violence on broadcast channels to
be regulated to certain hours of the day is the availability of less
restrictive means of regulating television violence. The government
can defend a regulation of speech against someone asserting First
Amendment rights if it can show that a compelling interest exists,
and that the regulation is the only viable means of achieving that
interest. For the state to pass legislation to regulate the
broadcasting of television violence, it must show that no alternative
means of achieving the same ends exist."'
In the debate over the regulation of television violence, the po-
tential less restrictive means that are most often cited are the V-
chip, 72 digital cable locks, and voluntary self-regulation. 74 To
validate the regulation of television violence to certain hours of the
day, the government will have to prove that none of these options,
171. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 881 (2000) ("When a
plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the
Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its
goals.").
172. See generally Ferenchak, supra note 18 (describing the V-chip and how it functions).
173. See Broadcasters Get Word Out How to Block Racy Shows, USA TODAY, June 3, 2005, at
2B (discussing technological means for parents to block unwanted programming).
174. See Campbell, supra note 45, at 753-55 (1999); Corn-Revere, supra note 12, at 190-
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nor any other option, can effectively achieve a compelling state
interest to regulate violent broadcasts.
In terms of the V-chip, The Telecommunications Act of 1996
" "
includes a requirement that signal-blocking technology, the so
176called "V-chip," be included in all new television sets. It might
appear that V-chip technology provides a less restrictive alternative
to "safe harbor" regulation. This assumes, however, that the V-chip
171can operate effectively to regulate television violence. It also as-
sumes that there is a V-chip in every television set.
178
In addition to the V-Chip, individuals with digital cable have the
option via an on-screen menu and their remote control to block
channels or programs based on television ratings."9 Similar to the
V-chip, the ability of digital cable locks to block unwanted depic-
tions of violence depends on how many homes are actually
equipped with this technology and whether this technology can be
used effectively to regulate television violence.
The Supreme Court's response to V-chip and other signal block-
ing technologies is unclear. In United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated § 505 of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 because a less restrictive provision of the
Act, § 504, allowed the indecent transmissions at issue to be fully
scrambled at the request of a viewer.'80 This suggests that the Court
will be willing to entertain the idea that the V-chip and digital cable
locks are viable alternatives to the regulation of television violence,
but if this issue becomes determinative, the Court will be forced to
rely on the trial courts, as finders of fact, to establish the viability of
the V-chip and other signal blocking technologies.
175. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.).
176. Id., § 551(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 139 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)-(x)
(2000)).
177. See generally THE V-CHIP DEBATE: CONTENT FILTERING FROM TELEVISION TO THE
INTERNET (Monroe E. Price ed., 1998) (providing an in-depth discussion of the merits and
shortcomings of the V-chip); Saunders, supra note 15, at 814 (suggesting that the V-chip is
having only "limited success").
178. See Scott, supra note 12, at 757 ("[Tlhe V-Chip will not be completely effective
unless it is installed in every television accessible to children.");Jennifer C. Kerr, Government
Takes Closer Look at Violence on Television, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 29, 2004, at AS,
available at 2004 WLNR 4984575 (Westlaw) ("A 2001 study by the Kaiser Family Foundation
found that 40 percent of American families own a television set with a V-chip, but only 17
percent of those families use the device.").
179. An Indecent Proposa4 Content Regulation, EcONOMIST, July 23, 2005, at 14, 14 ("Digi-
tal cable set-top boxes are particularly precise, and allow parents to block individual
programmes at the touch of a button on their remote control.").
180. 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000). This case is the most recent example of the Supreme
Court exploring the constitutional implications of "safe harbor" regulation of television.
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Voluntary self-regulation is probably not a feasible less restrictive
alternative because the entertainment industry has claimed to have
made numerous attempts to reform its programming habits.'"' If
legislation is passed, it is unlikely that a court will view an already
failing system of voluntary self-regulation as a viable alternative to
"safe harbor" regulation of television violence.
B. Overbreadth and Vagueness
To pass constitutional muster, a regulation of speech must not
be overly broad or vague. The doctrine of overbreadth demands
that a restriction of speech may not regulate speech beyond the
speech that can be legitimately restricted.'"3 A regulation of speech
may not sweep unnecessarily broadly and invade areas of protected
speech.'8 4 Although vagueness is similar to overbreadth, it differs in
that vagueness simply relates to a restriction of speech being un-
clear in its scope. A regulation of speech will be considered
unconstitutionally vague if individuals of common intelligence
must guess at its meaning.86 If a restriction of speech that
181. Corn-Revere, supra note 12, at 193-94 (discussing a variety of forms of self-
regulation that cable companies have attempted).
182. This once again assumes that the Court will find a compelling interest for the regu-
lation of television violence.
183. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (stating that over-
breadth occurs when a restriction of speech entails a substantial amount of protected
speech); see also Ballard, supra note 12, at 217 (discussing overbreadth and the regulation of
television violence).
184. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (holding that legislation must be
"reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal"); see also Bd. of Airport
Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987) (invalidating an airport authority
rule as substantially overbroad because no justification exists for an absolute ban of "all 'First
Amendment activities'" in the central terminal of Los Angeles International Airport);
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (invalidating a Houston ordinance as
substantially overbroad for making it unlawful "to ... in any manner oppose, molest, abuse
or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty").
185. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573, 578 (1974) (finding a Massachusetts statute
unconstitutionally vague for making it a crime to "treat[] contemptuously the flag of the
United States" due to the "absence of any ascertainable standard" for defining "treat[] con-
temptuously").
186. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int'l Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914))
(stating the standard for determining if a statute or regulation is unconstitutionally vague);
see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("[B]ecause we assume that a
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so he may act
accordingly.").
34 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
otherwise would be legitimate suffers from either overbreadth or
vagueness, it will be invalidated on First Amendment grounds.
187
In regards to the regulation of television violence, structuring a
restriction on speech that does not suffer from overbreadth or
vagueness will likely be impossible. Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C.
Circuit examines the problem: "Do we really want our children
protected from true depictions of our country's violent history:
lynchings, assassinations of Presidents, wars fought in the name of
justice and freedom, the Rodney King tapes?" 18  In essence, defin-
ing violence that merits regulation is a daunting task.'89
The Supreme Court has already noted the difficulty of crafting
legislation that is narrowly tailored to regulate harmful depictions
of violence. Returning to Winters v. New York, 190 the invalidated New
York statute attempted to prohibit the production, distribution,
and sale of publications "principally made up of criminal news, po-
lice reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of
deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime."' ' Although the Court recog-
nized the importance of the state's power to minimize the
incentives for crime and stimulation of juvenile delinquency, the
Court held that the statute was invalid because it was too vague to
be meaningfully interpreted, and included prohibitions against
constitutionally protected speech.9 The Court noted that invalida-
tion of this statute did not mean that the state could not punish
objectionable publications.9 However, Winters highlights how diffi-
cult it will be to define harmful violence without impinging on
constitutionally protected speech.' 94
187. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (invalidating a New
Orleans ordinance on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness for making it unlawful "to
curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any
member of the city police while in actual performance of his duty"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 519 (1972) (invalidating a Georgia statue on grounds of overbreadth and vague-
ness for making it a misdemeanor to "use to or of another... opprobrious words or abusive
language tending to cause a breach of the peace").
188. Wald, supra note 12, at 417 (discussing the implications of shielding children from
violent content in television programming).
189. See Corn-Revere, supra note 32, at 23-24, 28-30 (discussing that no well-established
definition of "violence" or "violent programming" exists for purposes of regulating television
violence); Ross, supra note 30, at 456-57 (discussing the problems of defining "violence" for
purposes of regulation).
190. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
191. Id. at 508.
192. Id. at 510-20.
193. Id. at 520.
194. The difficulty is that the more narrowly "violence" is defined, the less effective any
regulation will become. As Judge Patricia Wald noted:
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To regulate television violence, the state must give a defined
standard for determining what type of violence will be restricted to
certain hours. A regulation cannot give officials broad discretion in
determining what speech is objectionable. 95 If arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement is to be avoided, regulations of speech
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.'96 Under
these conditions, any definition of violence that the state might
adopt in attempting to regulate television violence will almost cer-
tainly be constitutionally invalid from overbreadth or vagueness.197
The only regulation that is likely to pass constitutional muster is
a regulation that provides a specific work or list of works that can
just be shown during "safe harbor" hours. Any other regulation will
almost certainly be too overbroad or vague to be constitutional be-
cause harmful violence is too difficult to define.
Canada, our neighbor to the North, has just adopted a violence code, written by the
television broadcasters but formally approved by the Canadian equivalent of our FCC,
and intended to be used in licensing decisions. During hours exclusive of 9:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m. the broadcasters will not show any program that "sanctions, promotes, or
glamorizes" violence, or contains "gratuitous violence in any form," and they are clas-
sifying programs according to their violence content. But the only casualty in its early
days has been Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, which some said would have been
dropped anyway because of low ratings.
Wald, supra note 12, at 414.
195. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (hold-
ing that a regulation of speech may not grant overly broad discretion to a government
official); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (holding that a
regulation unconstitutionally inhibits speech if discretion is left to the uncontrolled will of
an official); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) ("When a city allows an official to ban
[speech] in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression of free com-
munication of ideas.").
196. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("A vague law impermis-
sibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applica-
tion.").
197. Cf Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688-90 (8th Cir. 1992)
(invalidating for overbreadth and vagueness a Missouri state statute prohibiting the rental or
sale to minors of videos depicting violence and requiring dealers to display or maintain such
videos in separate areas within their stores); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 E
Supp. 2d 1180, 1189-91 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding a statue unconstitutionally vague for
regulating "video or computer games that contain realistic or photographic-like depictions
of aggressive conflict in which the player kills, injures, or otherwise causes physical harm to a
human form in the game who is depicted, by dress or other recognizable symbols, as a pub-
lic law enforcement officer").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The government will have to demonstrate compelling interests'98
for the Court to hold regulation of television violence to "safe har-
bor" hours constitutional. Even if the government can demonstrate
these compelling interests, it is unlikely that any regulation will
pass constitutional muster because the regulation will almost cer-
tainly be subject to strict scrutiny.'" Particularly damaging to the
government's regulation of television violence is the V-chip and
other signal blocking technologies that are being made available to
greater and greater numbers of individuals. °00 Unlike regulating
indecent materials, the "safe harbor" regulation of television vio-
lence would spark a fundamental change in American society
because violence is such an integral part of news and entertain-
ment in the United States. 0' Defining violence so as to justify
regulation is extremely difficult, and any regulation is likely to be
fatally flawed from overbreadth and vagueness.
202
198. See supra Part IV.
199. See Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 531-32 (Tenn.
1993) (stating that courts have invalidated all attempts to regulate material based solely on
violent content).
200. See supra Part V.A.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 135-137.
202. See supra Part V.B.
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